Distinguished contributors take up eminent scholar Daniel R. Schwarz’s reading of modern fiction and poetry as mediating between human desire and human action. The essayists follow Schwarz’s advice, “always the text, always historicize,” thus making this book relevant to current debates about the relationships between literature, ethics, aesthetics, and historical contexts.

This is the first modern book to describe Francis Bacon's jurisprudence. He has long been famous as a scientist, philosopher, politician and literary giant, but his career as one of England's greatest lawyers and jurists has been largely overlooked. Bacon's major contribution to Anglo-American jurisprudence is presented in such a way as to be suitable to specialists and non-specialists alike. The purpose is to restore Bacon to his rightful place as England's first true critical and analytical jurist, and to describe (...) how his legal thought related to his other great intellectual achievements. (shrink)

Kierkegaard’s distinction of chatter from silence gives forgiveness a linguistic spin. How can forgiveness be spoken? Is forgiveness something to be said and heard? Is saying it aloud saying too much, or too little? What is said when (and if) forgiveness is said? Should forgiveness be chatted away, or reserved in silence? For Kierkegaard, the answer(s) is (are) neither/nor: forgiveness can only be said indirectly, kept (almost) indistinguishable from resentment or indifference, as if discarded in the face of offense—if it (...) is to happen. (shrink)

Ignorance is trending. Politicians boast, "I'm not a scientist." Angry citizens object to a proposed state motto because it is in Latin, and "This is America, not Mexico or Latin America." Lack of experience, not expertise, becomes a credential. Fake news and repeated falsehoods are accepted and shape firm belief. Ignorance about American government and history is so alarming that the ideal of an informed citizenry now seems quaint. Conspiracy theories and false knowledge thrive. This may be the Information Age, (...) but we do not seem to be well informed. In this book, philosopher Daniel DeNicola explores ignorance -- its abundance, its endurance, and its consequences. (shrink)

Given the difficulty of characterizing the quandary introduced in Hume’s Appendix to the Treatise, coupled with the alleged “underdetermination” of the text, it is striking how few commentators have considered whether Hume addresses and/or redresses the problem after 1740—in the first Enquiry, for example. This is not only unfortunate, but ironic; for, in the Appendix, Hume mentions that more mature reasonings may reconcile whatever contradiction(s) he has in mind. I argue that Hume’s 1746 letter to Lord Kames foreshadows a subtle, (...) but significant, shift in Hume’s reasonings regarding the relevance of “real connexions”; that the Enquiry of 1748 provides evidence for this shift; and that this shift obviates Hume’s second thoughts by reconciling the contradiction that he had in mind. In short, Hume’s letter to Kames and Enquiry supply the retrodictive keys to a systematically satisfactory account. (shrink)

La imagen del jorobado que aparece aquí y allá en el corpus benjaminiano, una imagen que el mismo Benjamin califica como el prototipo de la distorsión es también el prototipo del sujeto necesitado de perdón. Una lectura crítica de los lugares en los que Benjamin refiere a esta “imagen distorsionada” ofrece la posibilidad de levantar una teoría del perdón que no reduce el perdón a una forma jurídica, a una particular dinámica emocional, o a un intercambio de condiciones morales, sino (...) que la dota además de una clara dimensión corporal que está simplemente ausente en la mayoría de las consideraciones a propósito del perdón desarrolladas en el siglo XX. (shrink)

pt. 1. Toward a theory of liberal education. Mixed messages and false starts -- Liberal education and human flourishing -- pt. 2. Paradigms of liberal education. Transmission of culture -- Self-actualization -- Understanding the world -- Engagement with the world -- The skills of learning -- pt. 3. The values and moral aims of liberal education. Core values of liberal education -- Intrinsic value -- Educating a good person -- pt. 4. Obstacles, threats and prospects. Persistent concerns -- Newfound threats (...) -- Promise and prospects. (shrink)

The fundamental postulate of sociobiology is that individuals exploit favorable environments to increase their genetic representation in the next generation. The data on fertility differentials among contemporary humans are not cotvietent with this postulate. Given the importance ofHomo sapiensas an animal species in the natural world today, these data constitute particularly challenging and interesting problem for both human sociobiology and sociobiology as a whole.The first part of this paper reviews the evidence showing an inverse relationship between reproductive fitness and “endowment” (...) in contemporary, urbanized societies. It is shown that a positive relationship is observed only for those cohorts who bore their children during a unique period of rising fertility, 1935–1960, and that these cohorts are most often cited by sociobiologists as supporting the central postulate of sociobiology. Cohorts preceding and following these show the characteristic inverse relationship between endowment and fertility. The second section reviews the existing so-ciobiological models of this inverse relationship, namely, those of Barkow, Burley, and Irons, as well as more informal responses among sociobiologists to the persistent violation of sociobiology's central postulate, such as those of Alexander and Dawkins. The third section asks whether the goals of sociobiology, given the violation of its fundamental postulate by contemporary human societies, might not be better thought of as applied rather than descriptive, with respect to these societies. A proper answer to this question begins with the measurement of the pace and direction of natural selection within modern human populations, as compared to other sources of change. The vast preponderance of the shifts in human trait distributions, including the IQ distribution, appears to be due to environmental rather than genetic change. However, there remains the question of just how elastic these distributions are in the absence of reinforcing genetic change. (shrink)

This dissertation is an investigation into the ground of moral objectivity. My preliminary claim is that in order to be objective, moral properties must be real properties. The following question is, what kind of properties are moral properties? A number of recent philosophers have argued that moral properties are natural properties. ''Natural" in this context means " open to investigation and discovery by the senses or by empirical science." The natural properties proposed in the recent literature are connected to the (...) property of human well-being. The main project of my dissertation is to show that natural properties are not adequate as the foundation for moral objectivity, because there is no necessary connection between any natural properties and moral properties. Another answer to the question of what kind of properties moral properties are is that they are supernatural properties. "Supernatural" in this context means "not open to investigation and discovery by the senses, or by empirical science." It is my argument that a singular supernatural being who created the world and has particular ideas about what sorts of people/actions/states of affairs are good and bad or right and wrong is the only sufficient ground for moral objectivity. Given such a being, moral properties will be real and objective. They will also be moral properties, since the originator of these properties confers value on them. Using and expanding on work in Divine Command Theory, especially that of Robert M. Adams, my original contribution to this discussion is to propose that moral properties are relational properties. The relationship is between persons, actions, states of affairs, etc., in the physical world, and the ideas, desires, character, or commands of the supernatural being. An important limitation of my dissertation project is that I do not consider any practical issues such as "How do we know whether God exists?", "How would God communicate the content of morality to us?", or "What is God like?" These are important and worthwhile questions, but are not a part of my present investigation. (shrink)

This volume offers a set of concise and accessible introductions to the seminal figures in the historical development of the just war tradition. In what, if any, circumstances are political communities justified in going to war? And what limits should apply to the conduct of any such war? The just war tradition is a body of thought that helps us think through these very questions. Its core ideas have been subject to fierce debate for over 2,000 years. Yet they continue (...) to play a prominent role in how political and military leaders address the challenges posed by the use of force in international society. Until now there has been no text that offers concise and accessible introductions to the key figures associated with the tradition. Stepping into this breach, Just War Thinkers provides a set of clear but detailed essays by leading experts on nineteen seminal thinkers, from Cicero to Jeff McMahan. This volume challenges the reader to think about how traditions are constituted--who is included and excluded, and how that is determined--and how they serve to enable, constrain, and indeed channel subsequent thought, debate, and exchange. This book will be of much interest to students of just war tradition and theory, ethics and war, philosophy, security studies and IR. (shrink)

In Fundamental Christian Ethics, Daniel Heimbach draws from decades of research and scholarship to introduce the field of Christian ethics in a comprehensive manner while showing how it dialogues with modern-day ethical topics and issues.

Deaths of Despair (DoD), or mortality resulting from suicide, drug overdose, and alcohol-related liver disease, have been rising steadily in the United States over the last several decades. In 2020, a record 186,763 annual despair-related deaths were documented, contributing to the longest sustained decline in US life expectancy since 1915–1918. This forum feature considers how health humanities disciplines might fruitfully engage with this era-defining public health catastrophe and help society better understand and respond to the crisis.

George Rupp's Beyond Existentialism and Zen, in its typological-structural analysis and model of religious pluralism, proffers an alternative to the dominant Kantian models (e.g., by John Hicks and Sarvepalli Radhakrish nan). The question for Rupp is not which religion is true and how to decide that issue-answered in the Kantian approach in terms of an unknowable Ding an sich that all religions, albeit imperfectly, try to approximate or conceptualize (i.e., God or the Transcendent)-but rather how do religions represent, at least (...) in principle, a structural possibility for salvation or human flourishing, however different and incompatible their distinct prima facie truth claims might be. Although the potential for a radically relativistic model is implicit in Rupp's approach, it is argued here that his Hegelian assumptions lead him to accept relativism only in a provisional ("critical") way; for Rupp, under ideal epistemic conditions (e.g., the Peircian "end of inquiry"), one final conceptualization of ultimate reality will emerge as absolute truth. In the final part of this essay a version of the relativistic model implicit in Rupp's approach is defended against both the Kantian model of Hicks et al. and Rupp's Hegelian-Peircian model, which, it is argued, is incompatible certainly with the spirit of his own typological-structural analysis, if not with the letter. In challenging what Rupp calls the truth of Zen, it is further argued that not only is more than one salvific structural possibility available to us through the different world religions but also that realizing these possibilities is principally a human responsibility, and that the cosmos is quite indifferent to and compatible with several possibilities, from the most destructive to the most conducive to human well being and flourishing. (shrink)

Throughout the course of Plato’s Statesman, an Eleatic Stranger makes several suggestions about what a statesman is. The Stranger refers to one of those suggestions, made at 276e, as ‘likely’ providing an ‘outline’ of the statesman. While that outline might not ultimately indicate what a statesman is, it points to some understanding of what it means to inquire into the being of a statesman. Foremost, the outline indicates that the statesman must be understood as a ruler of some kind. Moreover, (...) the statesman is a ruler whose focus should be on the people of the polis and so he must understand something of human nature. However, the statesman is also shaped by the tension created from the way in which rule itself belittles that nature, obscuring if not inhibiting the self-rule that is naturally or ideally human. The outline also acknowledges the reciprocal tendency of people to sacrifice their own self-rule, a tendency that makes ruling both more possible and more problematic. (shrink)

Why would businesses advocate for a tax increase? They may take such a position, this article argues, when tax cuts threaten their long-term economic interests. In 2012, Kansas eliminated taxes on many business owners but destabilized the economy and exposed small business to the harshness of market forces. Small businesses rely more on state services than large businesses and are more situated in local communities. The literature suggests two main reasons for small businesses’ “enlightened self-interest” perspective. First, many benefited only (...) marginally from the tax cuts. Second, the savings were offset by fiscal damage to state services that small businesses rely on. They advocated for higher taxes on themselves neither out of altruism nor entirely out of self-interest but recognizing that they had to pay taxes in order to stabilize the economic environment. In that position, small businesses in Kansas may occupy the moderating political role once occupied by a now-fractured corporate elite. (shrink)

This dissertation explores issues in the philosophy of psychology and metaphysics through the lens of the emotion of disgust, and its corresponding property, disgustingness. The first chapter organizes an extremely large body of data about disgust, imposes two constraints any theory must meet, and offers a cognitive model of the mechanisms underlying the emotion. The second chapter explores the evolution of disgust, and argues for the Entanglement thesis: this uniquely human emotion was formed when two formerly distinct mechanisms, one dedicated (...) to monitoring food intake and protecting against poisons, the other dedicated to protecting against parasitic infection, where driven together until they became functionally integrated. The third chapter explores the sorts of acquisition mechanisms that could give rise to the patterns of individual and cultural level variation we find with disgust elicitors. It argues for the Empathic Acquisition thesis, which holds that one important route for the social acquisition and transmission of disgust elicitors is linked to empathic recognition of facial expressions of the emotion. The fourth chapter builds on the Entanglement thesis, and embeds the emotion of disgust in gene-culture coevolutionary theory and the tribal instincts hypothesis. The Co-opt thesis is defended, which maintains that disgust was co-opted to play an important role in our moral psychology, particularly in our cognition of social norms and ethnic boundary markers. In doing so, however, it brings to bear many features initially linked to poisons and parasites. This explains the puzzling and troublesome character of moral judgments linked to disgust. After shifting gears from psychology to metaphysics, the fifth chapter recasts the Humean tradition of projectivism in the terminology of cognitive science. Using examples such as disgust, I argue that a psychologized projectivism is able to make sense of the idea that some properties are projected onto the world, rather than found there to begin with. The final chapter criticizes three other accounts of the property of disgustingness, two inspired by functionalism in the philosophy of color, one inspired by fittingness accounts in metaethics. I argue that none provide nearly as satisfactory account of the property as the psychologized projectivism articulated previously. (shrink)